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Abstract. The logic FO(ID) uses ideas from the field of logic program-
ming to extend first order logic with non-monotone inductive definitions.
Such logic formally extends logic programming, abductive logic program-
ming and datalog, and thus formalizes the view on these formalisms as
logics of (generalized) inductive definitions. The goal of this paper is to
study a deductive inference method for PC(ID), which is the propositional
fragment of FO(ID). We introduce a formal proof system based on the se-
quent calculus (Gentzen-style deductive system) for this logic. As PC(ID)
is an integration of classical propositional logic and propositional inductive
definitions, our sequent calculus proof system integrates inference rules for
propositional calculus and definitions. We present the soundness and com-
pleteness of this proof system with respect to a slightly restricted fragment
of PC(ID). We also provide some complexity results for PC(ID). By devel-
oping the proof system for PC(ID), it helps us to enhance the understanding
of proof-theoretic foundations of FO(ID), and therefore to investigate useful
proof systems for FO(ID).
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study deductive methods for the propositional fragment of FO(ID)
[14]. To motivate this study, we need to say a few words about the origin and the
motivation of FO(ID).
Perhaps the two most important knowledge representation paradigms of the mo-
ment are on the one hand, classical logic-based approaches such as description logics
[2], and on the other hand, rule-based approaches based on logic programming and
extensions such as Answer Set Programming and Abductive Logic Programming
[3,24]. The latter disciplines are rooted firmly in the discipline of Non-Monotonic
Reasoning [32]. FO(ID) integrates both paradigms in a tight, conceptually clean
manner. The key to integrate “rules” into classical logic (FO) is the observation that
natural language, or more precisely, the informal language of mathematicians, has
an informal rule-based construct: the construct of inductive/recursive definitions
(IDs).
In Figure 1 and Figure 2, we displayed two prototypical examples of the most
common forms of inductive definitions in mathematics: monotone ones, respectively
definitions by induction over a well-founded order. As seen in these figures, both
Definition 1. The transitive closure TG of a directed graph G is defined by induction:
– (x, y) ∈ TG if (x, y) ∈ G;
– (x, y) ∈ TG if for some vertex z, (x, z) ∈ TG and (z, y) ∈ TG.
Fig. 1. Definition of Transitive closure
Definition 2. The satisfaction relation |= between σ-interpretations I and propositional
formulas over σ is defined by structural induction:
- I |= p if p is an atom and p ∈ I,
- I |= ψ ∧ φ if I |= ψ and I |= φ,
- I |= ψ ∨ φ if I |= ψ or I |= φ,
- I |= ¬ψ if I 6|= ψ.
Fig. 2. Definition of satisfaction
are frequently represented as a set of informal rules. These two forms of inductive
definitions are generalized by the concept of iterated inductive definitions (IID) [6].
Inductive definitions define their concept by describing how to construct it through
a process of iterated application of rules starting from the empty set. Definitions
by induction over a well-founded order are frequently non-monotone, as illustrated
by the non-monotone rule “I |= ¬ψ if I 6|= ψ” which derives the satisfaction of ¬ψ
given the non-satisfaction of ψ.
Of course, a definition is not just a set of material implications. Thus, a sen-
sible scientific research question is to design a uniform, rule-based formalism for
representing these forms of definitions. Such a study is not only useful as a formal
logic study of the concept of inductive definition but it contributes to the under-
standing of rule-based systems and thus, to the study of the (formal and informal)
semantics of logic programming and the integration of classical logic-based and
rule-based approaches to knowledge representation.
Iterated inductive definitions have been studied in mathematical logic [6] but
the formalisms there are not rule-based and require an extremely tedious encoding
of rules and well-founded orderings into one complex formula [14]. In several papers
[11,12,14], it was argued that, although unintended by its inventors, the rule-based
formalism of logic programming under the well-founded semantics [20] and its ex-
tension to rules with FO-bodies in [19] correctly formalizes the above mentioned
forms of inductive definitions. Stated differently, if we express an informal inductive
definition of one of the above kinds into a set of formal rules
∀x¯(P (t¯)← φ)
then the informal semantics of the original definition matches the well-founded
semantics of the formal rule set. E.g., in a well-founded model of the following
“literal” translation of the definition in Figure 1:{
∀x, y (TG(x, y)← G(x, y))
∀x, y (TG(x, z)← (∃z TG(x, y) ∧ TG(y, z)))
}
TG is interpreted as the transitive closure of the graph interpreting G. A similar
claim holds for the literal translation of the definition of |= in Figure 2. Thus,
the rule formalism under the well-founded semantics provides the desired uniform
syntax and semantics for representing the above mentioned forms of inductive def-
inition construct.
There are several good arguments to integrate the above inductive definition
construct (and hence, this generalized form of logic programming under the well-
founded semantics) into FO. (1) FO and definitions are complementary KR lan-
guages: FO is a base language very suitable for expressing propositions, assertions
or constraints while it is well-known that, in general, inductive definitions cannot
be expressed in FO [25]. (2) Definitions are important for KR. In the case of non-
inductive definitions, their use for defining terminology was argued long time ago in
Brachman and Levesque’s seminal paper [5] and was the motivation for developing
description logics [2]. As for inductive definitions, they are quite likely as important
to declarative Knowledge Representation as recursive functions and procedures are
to programming. Applications of inductive definitions abound in KR: various in-
stances of transitive closure, definitions of recursive types and of concepts defined
over recursive types, descriptions of dynamic worlds through definitions of states in
terms of past states and effects of actions, etc. In [13], a formalization of situation
calculus in terms of iterated inductive definitions in FO(ID) yields an elegant and
very general solution for the ramification problem in the context of the situation
calculus. (3) Inductive definitions are also an interesting Non-Monotonic Reasoning
language construct. A logic is non-monotonic if adding new expressions to a theory
may invalidate previous inferences. Obviously, adding a new rule to an inductive
definition defines a different set and hence, this operation may invalidate previ-
ous inferences3. One of the main non-monotonic reasoning principles is the Closed
World Assumption (CWA) [35]. The intuition underlying CWA is that “an atom is
false unless it can be proven”. This matches with an inductive definition in which a
defined atom P (t¯) is false unless it is explicitly derived by one of its rules P (t¯)← ψ
during the construction process. Hence, inductive definitions can be viewed as a
very precise and well-understood form of Closed World Assumption. Moreover, it is
well-known that rule formalisms under CWA can be used to represent many useful
forms of defaults. The correspondence between CWA and inductive definition con-
struct implies that the methodologies to represent defaults developed in, e.g., logic
programming, can be used in an inductive definition formalism as well. Domain
Closure [31] is another important non-monotonic reasoning principle that can be
expressed through inductive definitions [14].
All the above provides a strong motivation for adding inductive definitions to
FO. Thus, the resulting logic FO(ID) extends FO not only with an inductive defi-
nition construct but also with an expressive and precise non-monotonic reasoning
principle. Not surprisingly, the logic FO(ID) is strongly tied to many other log-
ics. It is an extension of FO with inductive definitions and a conceptually clean
integration of FO and LP. It integrates monotonic and non-monotonic logics. The
3 Observe that the concept of (non-)monotonicity is used here in two different ways.
Adding a rule to a monotone inductive definition is a non-monotonic reasoning opera-
tion.
inductive definition construct of FO(ID) formally generalizes Datalog [1]: this is
a natural match, given that Datalog programs aim to define queries and views.
FO(ID) is also strongly related to fixpoint logics. Monotone definitions in FO(ID)
are a different -rule-based- syntactic sugar of the fixpoint formulas of Least Fix-
point Logic (LFP) [33,34]. Last but not least, FO(ID), being a conceptually clean,
well-founded integration of rules into classical logic, might play a unifying role in
the current attempts of extending FO-based description logics with rules [38]. It
thus appears that FO(ID) occupies quite a central position in the spectrum of
computational and knowledge representation logics.
Several attempts to build inference systems for FO(ID) are underway. One line
of research is the development of finite model generators [28,27,29,39] . They have
similar applications and speed as current Answer Set Programming solvers [17,16].
However, in this paper we study a more traditional form of inference: deduction.
As for every formal logical system, the development of deductive inference methods
for FO(ID) is an important research topic. There is no hope of course to build a
complete proof system of FO(ID). Indeed, inductive definability leads to undecid-
ability, not even semi-decidability. As such, the task we set out for this paper is
restricted to the development of a sound proof system and a decidable fragment of
FO(ID).
The goal of this paper is to extend the propositional part of Gentzen’s sequent
calculus to obtain a proof system for PC(ID), the propositional fragment of FO(ID).
We view our work as an initial investigation to build proof systems for (fragments
of) FO(ID). In proof theory, Gentzen’s sequent calculus LK [21,36] is a widely
known proof system for first order logic. The sequent calculus is well-suited to a
goal-directed approach for constructing logical derivations. The advantage of the
method is its theoretical elegance and the fact that it focuses the proof search, with
applicable proof rules constrained by logical connectives appearing in the current
goal sequent. Our work is inspired by the one of Compton, who used sequent
calculus (Gentzen-style deductive system) methods in [7,8] to investigate sound
and complete deductive inference methods for existential least fixpoint logic and
stratified least fixpoint logic. Existential least fixpoint logic, as described in [7], is a
logic with a least fixpoint operator but only existential quantification and stratified
least fixpoint logic, as shown in [8], is a logic with a least fixpoint operator and
characterizes the expressibility of stratified logic programs. Indeed, these two logics
without nested least fixpoint expressions can be viewed as fragments of FO(ID).
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. We introduce a sequent calculus for PC(ID).
2. We prove that the deductive system is sound and complete for a slightly re-
stricted fragment of PC(ID).
3. We provide some complexity results for PC(ID).
By developing a proof system for PC(ID), we want set a first step to enhance
the understanding of proof-theoretic foundations of FO(ID). One application of
this work could be for the development of tools to check the correctness of the
outputs generated by PC(ID) model generators such as MiniSat(ID) [29]. Given a
PC(ID) theory T as input, such a solver outputs a model for T or concludes that
T is unsatisfiable. In the former case, an independent model checker can be used
to check whether the output is indeed a model of T . However, when the solver
concludes that T is unsatisfiable, it is less obvious how to check the correctness
of this answer. One solution is to transform a trace of the solvers computation
into a proof of unsatisfiability in a PC(ID) proof system. An independent proof
checker can then be used to check this formal proof. Model and proof checkers can
be a great help to detect bugs in model generators. An analogous checker for the
Boolean Satisfiability problem (SAT) solvers was described in [40].
On the longer run, we view our work also as a first step towards the development
of proof systems and decidable fragments of FO(ID). A potential use of this is in the
field of description logics. Deductive reasoning is the distinguished form of inference
of Description Logics. Given the efforts to extend Description Logics with rules and
the fact that FO(ID) offers a natural, clean integration of a very useful form of rules
in FO, it seems that research on decidable fragments of FO(ID) could play a useful
role in that area.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We introduce PC(ID) in Section 2.
We present a sequent calculus proof system for PC(ID) in Section 3. The main
results of the soundness and completeness of the proof system are investigated in
Section 4. We provide some complexity results for PC(ID) in Section 5. We finish
with conclusions, related and future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present PC(ID), which is the propositional fragment of FO(ID) [14].
Observe that PC(ID) is an extension of propositional calculus (PC) with proposi-
tional inductive definitions (IDs).
2.1 Syntax
A propositional vocabulary τ is a set of propositional atoms. A formula of propo-
sitional calculus over τ , or briefly, a PC-formula over τ , is inductively defined as:
– an atom in τ is a PC-formula over τ ;
– if F is a PC-formula over τ , then so is ¬F ;
– if F1, F2 are PC-formulas over τ , then so are F1 ∧ F2 and F1 ∨ F2.
We use the following standard abbreviations: F1 ⊃ F2 for ¬F1∨F2 and F1 ≡ F2
for (F1 ∧ F2) ∨ (¬F1 ∧ ¬F2). A literal is an atom P or its negation ¬P . An atom
P has a negative (positive) occurrence in formula F if P has an occurrence in the
scope of an odd (even) number of occurrences of the negation symbol ¬ in F .
A definition D over τ is a finite set of rules of the form:
P ← ϕ,
where P ∈ τ and ϕ is a PC-formula over τ . Note that the symbol “←” is a new
symbol, which must be distinguished from (the inverse of) material implication ⊃.
For a rule of the above form, the atom P is called the head of the rule while ϕ
is known as its body. An atom appearing in the head of a rule of D is called a
defined atom of D, any other atom is called an open atom of D. We denote the
set of defined atoms by τdD and that of all open ones by τ
o
D. We call a definition
D positive if its defined symbols have only positive occurrences in rule bodies (i.e.,
occur in the scope of an even number of negation symbols).
D is called inductive or recursive in predicate P if its dependency relation ≺
satisfies P ≺ P . Here, the dependency relation ≺ of D on τ is the transitive closure
of the set of all pairs (Q,P ) such that for some rule P ← ϕ ∈ D, Q occurs in ϕ. The
intended informal semantics of a formal definition D is given by understanding it as
a -possibly inductive- definition of the defined symbols in terms of the open symbols.
This understanding is clear in case of positive definitions and the corresponding
formal semantics is obvious. In the next sections, we consider how this view extends
to arbitrary non-positive definitions.
A PC(ID)-formula over τ is defined by the following induction:
– an atom in τ is a PC(ID)-formula over τ ;
– a definition over τ is a PC(ID)-formula over τ ;
– if F is a PC(ID)-formula over τ , then so is ¬F ;
– if F1, F2 are PC(ID)-formulas over τ , then so are F1 ∧ F2 and F1 ∨ F2.
A PC(ID) theory over τ is a set of PC(ID)-formulas over τ .
Any definition containing multiple rules with the same atom in the head can
be easily transformed into a definition with only one rule per defined atom. We
illustrate this by the following example.
Example 1. The following definition


P ← O1 ∧Q
P ← P
Q← Q ∧ P
Q← O2


is equivalent to this one: {
P ← (O1 ∧Q) ∨ P
Q← (Q ∧ P ) ∨O2
}
.
As we mentioned in Section 1, monotone definitions in FO(ID) are a different
-rule-based- syntactic sugar of the fixpoint formulas of Least Fixpoint Logic (LFP).
We now illustrate the relation between a propositional inductive definition and a
propositional least fixpoint expression in fixpoint logics.
A propositional least fixpoint expression is of the form:
[LFPP1,...,Pn(θ1, . . . , θn)]ψ,
where for each i ∈ [1, . . . , n], Pi is a propositional atom, θi is either a propositional
formula or a propositional least fixpoint expression, ψ is either a propositional
formula or a propositional least fixpoint expression, and Pi occurs only positively
in θi and ψ. Note that the subformulas ψ, θ1, . . . , θn of a least fixpoint expression
[LFPP1,...,Pn(θ1, . . . , θn)]ψ may contain least fixpoint expressions. Indeed, nesting
of least fixpoint expressions is allowed in fixpoint logics. But nesting of definitions
is not allowed in PC(ID). All subformulas ψ, θ1, . . . , θn of an unnested least fixpoint
expression contain only positive occurrences of each atom Pi. It is worth mention-
ing that the unnested least fixpoint expression [LFPP1,...,Pn(θ1, . . . , θn)]ψ, where
θ1, . . . , θn, ψ may not contain least fixpoint expressions, corresponds exactly to the
second order PC(ID)-formula
∃P1 . . . Pn




P1 ← θ1
...
Pn ← θn

 ∧ ψ

 .
However, such a correspondence does not hold for nested least fixpoint expressions
since only PC-formulas are allowed as bodies of rules in definitions.
In summary, the differences between the definition construct and the fixpoint
definitions are:
– The fixpoint notation is formula-based and defines predicate variables with
scope restricted to the fixpoint expression while a definition construct is rule-
based and defines predicate constants. (These are “syntactic sugar” differences.)
– Fixpoint expressions can be nested while definitions cannot. On the other hand,
in fixpoint expressions, the defined variables can occur only positively in the
defining formulas, while in definitions, the defined predicates can occur nega-
tively in rule bodies.
The relation between definitions and LFP are investigated in [23].
2.2 Semantics
In this section, we formalize the informal semantics of the two most common forms
of inductive definition, monotone inductive definitions (e.g., the definition of transi-
tive closure, Figure 1) and definitions over a well-founded order (e.g., the definition
of the satisfaction relation |=, Figure 2), and their generalization, the notion of an
iterated inductive definition. These informal types of definitions might be roughly
characterized as follows:
– The rules of a monotone inductive definition of a set add objects to the defined
set given the presence of certain other objects in the set.
– For an inductive definition over some (strict) well-founded order, a rule adds an
object x given the presence or absence of certain other strictly smaller objects
in the set.
– Finally, an iterated inductive definition is associated with a well-founded semi-
order 4 such that each rule adds an object x given the presence of some other
less or equivalent objects in the defined set and the absence of some strictly less
objects.
4 A semi-order ≤ is a transitive reflexive binary relation. Two elements x, y are ≤-
equivalent if x ≤ y and y ≤ x, and x is strictly less than y if x ≤ y and y 6≤ x
are not equivalent. A semi-order is well-founded if it has no infinite strictly descending
chains x0 > x1 > x2 > . . . .
According to this characterizations, iterated inductive definitions generalize the
other types. Non-monotonicity of the two latter types of definitions stem from rule
conditions that refer to the absence of objects in the defined set (as in the condition
of “I |= ¬ψ if I 6|= ψ”). Adding a new element to the set might violate a condition
what was previously satisfied. For an extensive argument how the well-founded
semantics uniformally formalizes these three principles, we refer to [12,14]. Below,
we just sketch the main intuitions.
As we all know, the set defined by any of the aforementioned forms of inductive
definitions can be obtained constructively as the limit of an increasing sequence
of sets, by starting with the empty set and iteratively applying unsatisfied rules
until saturation. A key difference between monotone definitions and non-monotone
inductive definitions is that in the first, once the condition of a rule is satisfied
in some intermediate set, it holds in all later stages of the construction. This is
not the case for non-monotone inductive definitions. E.g., in the construction of
|=, the set of formulas ψ for which the condition of the rule “I |= ¬ψ if I 6|= ψ”
holds, initially contains all formulas and gradually decreases. As a consequence,
the order of rule applications is arbitrary for monotone inductive definitions but
matters for non-monotone definitions. There, it is critical to delay application of
an unsatisfied rule until it is certain that its condition will not be falsified by later
rule applications. This is taken care of by applying the rules along the well-founded
order provided with the definition (e.g., the subformula order in the definition of
|=). In particular, application of a rule deriving some element x is delayed until no
unsatisfied rule is left deriving a strictly smaller object y < x.
It would be rather straightforward to formalize this idea for PC(ID) if it was not
that a PC(ID) definition D does not come with a explicit order. Fortunately, there
is a different way to make sure that a rule can be safely applied, i.e., that later rule
applications during the inductive process will not falsify its condition. To do this,
we need to distinguish whether a defined atomic proposition has been derived to be
true, to be false or is still underived. E.g., once I |= ψ is derived to be true, we can
safely apply the rule for disjunctions and derive I |= ψ ∨ φ to be true, even I |= φ
is still underived. Likewise, we can safely derive I 6|= ψ∧φ as soon as we found out
I 6|= ψ. Applying this criterion relies on the ability to distinguish whether a defined
atomic proposition (such as “I |= ψ”) has been derived to be true, to be false
or is still underived, and whether a rule condition is certainly satisfied, certainly
dissatisfied or still unknown in such state. This naturally calls for a formalization
of the induction process in a three-valued setting where intermediate stages of the
set in construction are represented by three-valued sets instead of two-valued sets,
and rules are evaluated in these three-valued sets.
Below we present the formalization of the well-founded semantics introduced
in [15]. Compared to the original formalizations in [20,19], it is geared directly at
formalizing the inductive process as described above, using concepts of three-valued
logic. We start its presentation by recalling some basic concepts of three-valued
logic.
Consider the set of truth values {t, f ,u}. The truth order ≤ on this set is induced
by f ≤ u ≤ t and the precision order ≤p is induced by u ≤p f and u ≤p t. Define
f−1 = t, u−1 = u and t−1 = f .
Let τ be a propositional vocabulary. A three-valued τ -interpretation, also called
a τ -valuation, is a function I from τ to the set of truth values {t, f ,u}. An interpre-
tation is called two-valued if it maps no atoms to u. Given two disjoint vocabularies
τ and τ ′, a τ -interpretation I and a τ ′-interpretation I ′, the τ ∪ τ ′-interpretation
mapping each element P of τ to I(P ) and each P ∈ τ ′ to I ′(P ) is denoted by I+I ′.
When τ ′ ⊆ τ , we denote the restriction of a τ -interpretation I to the symbols of τ ′
by I|τ ′ . For a τ -interpretation I, a truth value v and an atom P ∈ τ , we denote by
I[P/v] the τ -interpretation that assigns v to P and corresponds to I for all other
atoms. We extend this notation to sets of atoms. Both truth and precision order
can be extended to an order on all τ -interpretations by I ≤ J if for each atom
P ∈ τ , I(P ) ≤ J(P ) and I ≤p J if for each atom P ∈ τ , I(P ) ≤p J(P ).
A three-valued interpretation I on τ can be extended to all PC-formulas over
τ by induction on the subformula order:
– P I = I(P ) if P ∈ τ ;
– (ϕ ∧ ψ)I = min≤({ϕI , ψI});
– (ϕ ∨ ψ)I = max≤({ϕI , ψI});
– (¬ϕ)I = (ϕI)−1.
The following proposition states a well-known monotonicity property with re-
spect to the precision order.
Proposition 1. Let ϕ be a PC-formula over τ and I, J be three-valued τ-interpretations
such that I ≤p J . Then ϕI ≤p ϕJ .
Another well-known proposition states a monotonicity property with respect to
the truth order.
Proposition 2. Let ϕ be a PC-formula over τ and I, J be three-valued τ-interpretations
such that if P I < P J , then P only occurs positively in ϕ and if P I > P J then P
only occurs negatively in ϕ. Then ϕI ≤ ϕJ .
The above properties about the precision and truth order will be applied fre-
quently in the proofs in Section 4. For brevity, we will not mention them explicitly
in the remainder of the paper.
We now define the semantics of definitions. Let D be a definition over τ and
IO a two-valued τ
o
D-interpretation, i.e., an interpretation of all open symbols of D.
Consider a sequence of three-valued τ -interpretations (In)n≥0 extending IO such
that I0(P ) = u for every P ∈ τdD, and for every natural number n, I
n+1 relates to
In in one of the following ways:
1. In+1 = In[P/t] where P is a defined atom such that P I
n
= u and for some
rule P ← ϕ ∈ D,ϕI
n
= t.
2. In+1 = In[U/f ], where U is a non-empty set of defined atoms, such that for
each P ∈ U , In(P ) = u and for each rule P ← ϕ ∈ D, ϕI
n+1
= f .
The first derivation rule 1 derives true atoms and is a straightforward for-
malization of the principle explained in the beginning of this section. The second
derivation rule 2 is less obvious and serves to derive falsity of defined atoms. Let
us first consider a more obvious special case that is subsumed by rule 2:
3. In+1 = In[P/f ] where P is a defined atom such that In(P ) = u and for each
rule P ← ϕ ∈ D, ϕI
n
= f .
This rule expresses that if the body of each rule that could derive P is certainly
false at stage n, then P can be asserted to be false at stage n+ 1. This is a special
case of the rule 2. Indeed, taking U = {P}, we have for each P ← ϕ ∈ D that
f = ϕI
n
≤p ϕI
n[U/f ] = ϕI
n+1
= f .
The stronger derivation rule 2 expresses that the atoms in a set U consisting
of underived defined atoms can be turned to false if the assumption that they
are all false suffices to dissatisfy the condition of each rule that could produce an
element of U . A set U as used in this rule corresponds exactly to an unfounded
set as defined in [20]. The rationale behind this derivation rule and the link with
informal induction is that when U is an unfounded set at stage n then none of its
atoms can be derived anymore at later stages of the construction process (using
derivation rule 1). To see this, assume towards contradiction that at some later
stage > n, one or more elements of U could be derived to be true, and let P be
the first atom that could be derived, say at stage m > n. At stage m, it holds
for each Q ∈ U that Im(Q) = u and for some rule P ← ϕ ∈ D, ϕI
m
= t. But
In[U/f ] ≤p Im[U/f ] ≥p Im and hence, f = ϕI
n[U/f ] ≤p ϕI
m[U/f ] ≥p ϕI
m
= t and
this yields a contradiction. Thus, the derivation rule 2 correctly concludes that the
atoms in U are no longer derivable through rule application. This derivation rule
is needed to derive, e.g., falsity of all atoms not in the least fixpoint of a monotone
definition, which is something that cannot be derived in general by the rule 3.
We call a sequence as defined above a well-founded induction. A well-founded
induction is terminal if it cannot be extended anymore. It can be shown that each
terminal well-founded induction is a sequence of increasing precision and its limit
is the well-founded partial interpretation of D extending IO [15]. We denote the
well-founded partial interpretation of D extending IO by I
D
O .
We define that DI = t if I = (I|τo
D
)D and I is two-valued. Otherwise, we define
DI = f . Adding this as a new base case to the definition of the truth function of
formulas, we can extend the truth function inductively to all PC(ID)-formulas.
We are now ready to define the semantics of PC(ID). For an arbitrary PC(ID)-
formula ϕ, we say that an interpretation I satisfies ϕ, or I is a model of ϕ, if I is
two-valued and ϕI = t. As usual, this is denoted by I |= ϕ. I satisfies (is a model
of) a PC(ID) theory T if I satisfies every ϕ ∈ T .
A definition lays a functional relation between the interpretation of the defined
symbols and those of the open symbols. In particular, two models of a definition
differ on the open symbols. A model of a monotone definition is the ≤-least inter-
pretation satisfying the rules of the definition (interpreted as material implications)
given a fixed interpretation of the open symbols, as desired. Also, the semantics of
PC(ID) is two-valued and extends the standard semantics of propositional logic.
A three-valued interpretation I is never a model of a definition, not even if it is a
well-founded partial interpretation of the definition.
Example 2. Consider the following definition:
D =
{
P ← Q
Q← P
}
.
Then τoD = ∅ and τ
d
D = {P,Q}. There are no open symbols and there is only one
model of D, namely the interpretation mapping both P and Q to f .
2.3 Where the informal semantics breaks
The informal semantics of a PC(ID) rule set as an inductive definition breaks in
some cases. Examples are non-monotone rule sets with recursion over negation such
as {
P ← ¬P
}
or {
P ← ¬Q
Q← ¬P
}
Their (unique) well-founded partial interpretation is not two-valued, and hence,
these definitions have no model and are inconsistent in PC(ID).
The restriction to two-valued well-founded partial models was imposed to en-
force the view that a well-designed definition D ought to define the truth of all its
defined atoms, i.e., the inductive process should be able to derive truth or falsity
of all defined atoms. This motivates the following concept.
Definition 3 (Totality,[14]). Let IO be a two-valued interpretation of τ
o
D. A def-
inition D is total in I if IDO is two-valued. The definition D is total in the context
of a theory T if D is total in M |τo
D
, for each model M of T . A definition D is total
if it is total in every two-valued interpretation IO of its open atoms.
A simple and very general syntactic criterion that guarantees that a definition
is total can be phrased in terms of the dependency relation ≺ of D. A definition D
is stratified if for each rule P ← ϕ, for each symbol Q with a negative occurrence
in ϕ, P 6≺ Q. This means that the definition of Q does not depend on P .
Proposition 3 ([20]). If D is stratified then D is total.
Observe that a stratified definition formally satisfies the (informal) condition that
was stated for iterated inductive definitions early in this section. The well-founded
semi-order underlying an iterated inductive definition is nothing else than the re-
flexive closure  of ≺. Atoms Q with a positive occurrence in the body of a rule
deriving P satisfy Q  P ; those with a negative occurrence satisfy Q  P and
P 6 Q. Hence, such rules effectively derive P given the presence of less or equiv-
alent atoms and the absence of strictly less atoms in the defined valuation. The
well-founded model of such definitions is two-valued and corresponds exactly to
the structure obtained by the construction described in Section 2.2 for (informal)
inductive definitions. Thus, the well-founded semantics correctly formalizes the in-
formal semantics of inductive definitions, and correctly constructs the (informally)
defined relations without knowing the underlying (semi-)order of the definition.
Although the class of stratified definitions is large and comprises almost all
“practical” PC(ID) definitions that we encountered in applications, there are intu-
itively sensible definitions which are total but not stratified.
Example 3. A software system consists of two servers S1 and S2 that provide
identical services. One server acts as master and the other as slave, and these roles
are assigned on the basis of clear (but irrelevant) criterion that can be expressed
in the form of a set of defining rules for the predicate Master(s). Clients can
request services x. The master makes a selection among these requests on the basis
of a clear (but irrelevant) criterion expressed in a definition of Criterion(x). The
slave fulfills all requests that are not accepted by the master. Here is the core of a
(predicate) definition:


Criterion(x)← . . .
Master(s)← . . .
Slave(s)← ¬Master(s)
Accepts(x,m)← Request(x) ∧Master(m) ∧ Criterion(x)
Accepts(x, s)← Request(x) ∧ Slave(s) ∧ ∃m(Master(m) ∧ ¬Accepts(x,m))


The (propositionalisation of the) definition is not stratified since the last rule creates
a negative dependency between Accepts(x, S1) and Accepts(x, S2). Yet, since no
server can be both master and slave, this recursion is broken “locally” in each
model. This is a total, albeit unstratified definition of the predicate Accepts that
correctly implements the informal specification.
The proof system for PC(ID), as presented below, is sound and complete with
respect to all PC(ID) theories containing only total definitions, and hence to any
fragment of PC(ID) that enforces totality of the allowed definitions.
3 LPC(ID): A Proof system for PC(ID)
In this section we formulate a proof system, LPC(ID), for the logic PC(ID) in the
sequent calculus style originally developed by Gentzen in 1935 [21]. Our system can
be seen essentially as a propositional part of classical sequent calculus adaptation
of inference rules for definitions. We give the proof rules of LPC(ID), which are
the rules of Gentzen’s original sequent calculus for propositional logic, augmented
with rules for introducing defined atoms on the left and right of sequents, a rule
for inferring the non-totality of definitions and a rule for introducing definitions on
the right of sequents.
First, we introduce some basic definitions and notations. Let capital Greek let-
ters Γ,∆, . . . denote finite (possibly empty) sets of PC(ID)-formulas. Γ,∆ denotes
Γ ∪∆. Γ, ϕ denotes Γ ∪{ϕ}. By
∧
Γ , respectively
∨
Γ , we denote the conjunction,
respectively disjunction of all formulas in Γ . By ¬Γ , we denote the set obtained
by taking the negation of each formula in Γ . By Γ \∆, we denote the set obtained
by deleting from Γ all occurrences of formulas that occur in ∆. Γ is said to be
consistent if there is no formula ϕ such that both ϕ and ¬ϕ can be derived from
Γ .
A sequent is an expression of the form Γ → ∆. Γ and ∆ are respectively called
the antecedent and succedent of the sequent and each formula in Γ and ∆ is called a
sequent formula. In general, a formula ϕ occurring as part of a sequent denotes the
set {ϕ}. We will denote sequents by S, S1, . . .. A sequent Γ → ∆ is valid, denoted
by |= Γ → ∆, if every model of
∧
Γ satisfies
∨
∆. A counter-model for Γ → ∆ is an
interpretation I such that I |=
∧
Γ but I 6|=
∨
∆. The sequent Γ → is equivalent
to Γ → ⊥ and → ∆ is equivalent to ⊤ → ∆, where ⊥,⊤ are logical constants
denoting false and true, respectively.
An inference rule is an expression of the form
S1; . . . ;Sn
S
n ≥ 0
where S1, . . . , Sn and S are sequents. Each Si is called a premise of the inference
rule, S is called the consequence. Intuitively, an inference rule means that S can be
inferred, given that all S1, . . . , Sn are already inferred.
The initial sequents, or axioms of LPC(ID) are all sequents of the form
Γ,A→ A,∆ or ⊥ → ∆ or Γ → ⊤
where A is any PC(ID)-formula, Γ and ∆ are arbitrary sets of PC(ID)-formulas.
The inference rules for LPC(ID) consist of structural rules, logical rules and
definition rules. The structural and logical rules, which follow directly the propo-
sitional inference rules in Gentzen’s original sequent calculus for first-order logic
LK, deal with the propositional part of PC(ID) and are given as follows, in which
A,B are any PC(ID)-formulas and Γ,∆ are arbitrary sets of PC(ID)-formulas.
Structural rules
– Weakening rules
left:
Γ → ∆
A,Γ → ∆
; right:
Γ → ∆
Γ → ∆,A
.
– Contraction rules
left:
A,A, Γ → ∆
A,Γ → ∆
; right:
Γ → ∆,A,A
Γ → ∆,A
.
– Cut rule
Γ → ∆,A; A,Γ → ∆
Γ → ∆
.
Logical rules
– ¬ rules
left:
Γ → ∆,A
¬A,Γ → ∆
; right:
A,Γ → ∆
Γ → ∆,¬A
.
– ∧ rules
left:
A,B, Γ → ∆
A ∧B,Γ → ∆
; right:
Γ → ∆,A; Γ → ∆,B
Γ → ∆,A ∧B
.
– ∨ rules
left:
A,Γ → ∆; B,Γ → ∆
A ∨B,Γ → ∆
; right:
Γ → ∆,A,B
Γ → ∆,A ∨B
.
Our deductive system LPC(ID) is then obtained from the propositional part
of LK by adding inference rules for definitions. The definition rules of LPC(ID)
consist of the right definition rule, the left definition rule, the non-total definition
rule and the definition introduction rule. Without loss of generality, in what follows
we assume that there is only one rule with head P in a definition D for every
P ∈ τdD. We refer to this rule as the rule for P in D and denote it by P ← ϕP .
Right definition rule for P . The right definition rule introduces defined atoms
in the succedents of sequents. It allows inferring the truth of a defined atom from
a definition D and is therefore closely related to the derivation rule 1 for extending
a well-founded induction. Let D be a definition and P a defined atom of D. The
right definition rule for P is given as follows.
Γ → ∆,ϕP
D,Γ → ∆,P
where Γ and ∆ are arbitrary sets of PC(ID)-formulas.
We illustrate this inference rule with an example.
Example 4. Consider the definition
D =
{
P ← P ∧ ¬Q
Q← ¬P
}
.
The instance of the right definition rule for P is
Γ → ∆,P ∧ ¬Q
D,Γ → ∆,P
,
and the instance of the right definition rule for Q is
Γ → ∆,¬P
D, Γ → ∆,Q
.
Left definition rule for Pi ∈ U . The left definition rule introduces defined
atoms in the antecedents of sequents. It allows inferring the falsity of a defined
atom from a definition D and is therefore closely related to the second derivation
rule 2 for extending a well-founded induction.
We first introduce some notations. Given a set U of atoms, let U⊲ be a set
consisting of one new atom P ⊲ for every P ∈ U . The vocabulary τ augmented with
these symbols is denoted by τ⊲. Given a PC-formula ϕ, ϕ⊲ denotes the formula
obtained by replacing all positive occurrences of an atom P ∈ U in ϕ by P ⊲. We
call ϕ⊲ the renaming of ϕ with respect to U . For a set of PC-formulas F , F ⊲ denotes
{ϕ⊲ | ϕ ∈ F}. For arbitrary PC-formula ϕ, by ¬ϕ⊲, we mean ¬(ϕ⊲).
Let D be a definition over τ and U a non-empty set of atoms such that U ⊆ τdD.
Denote by ¬U⊲ the set {¬P ⊲|P ∈ U}. Let Γ and ∆ be sets of PC(ID)-formulas
over τ . The left definition rule for every Pi ∈ U is given as follows, where U =
{P1, . . . , Pn}.
¬U⊲, Γ → ∆,¬ϕ⊲P1 ; . . . ;¬U
⊲, Γ → ∆,¬ϕ⊲Pn
Pi, D, Γ → ∆
.
Actually, in the left definition rule, the set of atoms U is a candidate unfounded
set of D.
We illustrate this inference rule with an example.
Example 5. Given a definition D =
{
P ← P ∧ ¬Q
Q← Q
}
,
– U = {P}, the instance of the left definition rule for P ∈ U is
¬P ⊲, Γ → ∆,¬(P ⊲ ∧ ¬Q)
P,D, Γ → ∆
– U = {Q}, the instance of the left definition rule for Q ∈ U is
¬Q⊲, Γ → ∆,¬Q⊲
Q,D, Γ → ∆
– U = {P,Q}, the instance of the left definition rule for P ∈ U is
¬P ⊲,¬Q⊲, Γ → ∆,¬(P ⊲ ∧ ¬Q); ¬P ⊲,¬Q⊲, Γ → ∆,¬Q⊲
P,D, Γ → ∆
– U = {P,Q}, the instance of the left definition rule for Q ∈ U is
¬P ⊲,¬Q⊲, Γ → ∆,¬(P ⊲ ∧ ¬Q); ¬P ⊲,¬Q⊲, Γ → ∆,¬Q⊲
Q,D, Γ → ∆
.
Non-total definition rule for D. The non-total definition rule allows infer-
ring the non-totality of a definition D. We introduce some notations. Let D be
a definition over τ and V a non-empty set of atoms such that V ⊆ τdD. Denote
by τ⋄ the vocabulary τ ∪ V ⊲ ∪ V ⋄, where both V ⊲ and V ⋄ are sets of new and
different renamings P ⊲ and P ⋄ of all symbols P of V . Denote by ϕ⋄ the formula
obtained by replacing each positive occurrence of each P ∈ V in ϕ by P ⊲ and
each negative occurrence of each P ∈ V in ϕ by P ⋄. Denote by D⋄ the definition
{P ⊲ ← ϕ⋄P | P ∈ V and P ← ϕP ∈ D} over the new vocabulary τ
⋄. Let Γ and
∆ be sets of PC(ID)-formulas over τ . Then the non-total definition rule for D is
given as follows.
V ⋄, D⋄, Γ → ∆,
∧
¬V ⊲; ¬V ⋄, D⋄, Γ → ∆,
∧
V ⊲
D,Γ → ∆
We illustrate this inference rule with an example.
Example 6. Given a definition D =


P ← P ∧ ¬Q
Q← ¬Q ∧R
R← ¬R

, V = {Q,R} and Γ and ∆
empty sets. Then the instance of the non-total definition for D is
Q⋄, R⋄, D⋄ → ¬Q⊲ ∧ ¬R⊲; ¬Q⋄,¬R⋄, D⋄ → Q⊲ ∧R⊲
D →
,
where D⋄ =
{
Q⊲ ← ¬Q⋄ ∧R⊲
R⊲ ← ¬R⋄
}
.
For the intuition behind the non-total definition rule, we point the readers to
[14] and Section 2.3 where the cause of the non-totality of a definition is explained.
We do not have an inference rule to prove totality of all definitions in the context
of a certain set Γ of PC(ID)-formulas. Such an inference rule would involve proving
that each model of Γ can be extended to a model of the definition. In fact, we cannot
even formulate this condition as a sequent.
Definition introduction rule for D. The three definitional inference rules in-
troduced so far, introduce a definition in the antecedent of the consequence. Hence,
none of these rules can be used to infer that under certain conditions a definition
holds. The definition introduction rule allows inferring the truth of a total definition
from PC(ID)-formulas.
We introduce some notations. Let D be a total definition. Denote by P ′ a new
defined atom for each P ∈ τdD. Denote by τ
′ the vocabulary τ ∪ {P ′ | P ∈ τdD}.
Denote by D′ the definition over the new vocabulary τ ′ obtained by replacing each
occurrence of each defined symbol P in D by P ′. Let Γ and ∆ be sets of PC(ID)-
formulas over the old vocabulary τ . The definition introduction rule for D is given
as follows, where P1, . . . , Pn are all defined atoms of D.
D′, Γ → ∆,P ′1 ≡ P1; . . . ;D
′, Γ → ∆,P ′n ≡ Pn
Γ → ∆,D
We illustrate this inference rule with an example.
Example 7. Given a definition D =
{
P ← O
Q← Q ∧ P
}
, Γ = {O,P,¬Q} and ∆ an
empty set. Then the instance of the definition introduction rule for D is
D′, O, P,¬Q→ P ′ ≡ P ; D′, O, P,¬Q→ Q′ ≡ Q
O,P,¬Q→ D
,
where D′ =
{
P ′ ← O
Q′ ← Q′ ∧ P ′
}
.
The inference rule proposed here has a definition in the succedent of its premise
and hence, allows to infer the truth of a definition. Unfortunately, this rule is only
sound given that the inferred definition is total. We will give an example to show
that the definition introduction rule is not sound given that the inferred definition
is non-total right after proving the soundness of this inference rule.
Proofs of PC(ID). We now come to the notion of an LPC(ID)-proof for a
sequent.
Definition 4. An LPC(ID)-proof for a sequent S, is a tree T of sequents with
root S. Moreover, each leaf of T must be an axiom and for each interior node S′
there exists an instance of an inference rule such that S′ is the consequence of that
instance while the children of S′ are precisely the premises of that instance. T is
often called a proof tree for S. A sequent S is called provable in LPC(ID), or
LPC(ID)-provable, if there is an LPC(ID)-proof for it.
Example 8. Given a definition D =
{
P ← O
Q← Q ∧ P
}
, the following is an LPC(ID)-
proof for O,D → P ∧ ¬Q.
O→ Oright definition rule
O,D → P
Q⊲ → Q⊲
left ¬
¬Q⊲, Q⊲ →
left weakening
¬Q⊲, Q⊲, P →
left ∧
¬Q⊲, Q⊲ ∧ P →
right ¬
¬Q⊲ → ¬(Q⊲ ∧ P )
left definition rule
Q,D→
right ¬
D → ¬Q
left weakening
O,D → ¬Q
right ∧
O,D → P ∧ ¬Q
4 Main results
In this section, we will prove that the deductive system LPC(ID) is sound and
complete for a slightly restricted fragment of PC(ID), which can be viewed as main
theoretical results of this paper.
4.1 Soundness
To prove the soundness of LPC(ID), it is sufficient to prove that all axioms of
LPC(ID) are valid and that every inference rule of LPC(ID) is sound, i.e. if all
premises of an inference rule are valid then the consequence of that rule is valid. It
is trivial to verify that the axioms are valid and that the structural and logical rules
are sound (see e.g. [36,37]). Hence, only the soundness of the right definition rule,
the left definition rule, the non-total definition rule and the definition introduction
rule must be proved.
Lemma 1. Let I be a model of D and P a defined atom of D. Then I |= P if and
only if I |= ϕP .
Proof. Because I is a model of D, there exists a terminal well-founded induction
(In)n≤ξ for D with the limit I
ξ = I.
(if part) Assume that I |= ϕP . The sequence (In)n≤ξ is strictly increasing in
precision, hence there is no n ≤ ξ such that ϕI
n
P = f . As such, for every n ≤ ξ,
P I
n
6= f . Therefore, P I 6= f and because I is two-valued, we can conclude P I = t.
(only if part) Assume that I |= P . Thus, for some n < ξ, P I
n
= u and P I
n+1
=
t. Hence, ϕI
n
P = t. Because the sequence (I
n)n≤ξ is strictly increasing in precision,
we have ϕIP = t.
Lemma 2 (Soundness of the right definition rule). Let D be a definition and
P a defined atom of D. If |= Γ → ∆,ϕP , then |= D,Γ → ∆,P .
Proof. Assume |= Γ → ∆,ϕP but 6|= D,Γ → ∆,P . Then there exists a counter-
model I for D,Γ → ∆,P which satisfies D,
∧
Γ,¬
∨
∆ and ¬P . It follows from the
first assumption that I |= ϕP , and hence, by Lemma 1, I |= P , a contradiction.
Lemma 3 (Soundness of the left definition rule). Let D be a definition and U
be a non-empty subset of τdD. If for every P ∈ U , it holds that |= ¬U
⊲, Γ → ∆,¬ϕ⊲P ,
then for all P ∈ U , it holds that |= P,D, Γ → ∆.
Proof. Assume |= ¬U⊲, Γ → ∆,¬ϕ⊲P for every P ∈ U , but 6|= P,D, Γ → ∆ for
some P ∈ U . Then there exists a model I of D,
∧
Γ and ¬
∨
∆ satisfying at least
one P ∈ U . Furthermore, by Lemma 1, it holds that I |= ϕP . We select this P
in the following way. Let (In)n≤ξ be a terminal well-founded induction for D with
limit Iξ = I. Let n be the smallest n ≤ ξ such that for some Q ∈ U , QI
n
= u and
QI
n+1
= t. By selection of n, there is a unique P ∈ U such that P I
n
= u, In |= ϕP
and P I
n+1
= t. Consider this P and ϕP .
On the one hand, it holds that I |= ϕP . On the other hand, consider the
interpretation I⊲ = I[U⊲/f ]. It is clear that I⊲ satisfies ¬U⊲,
∧
Γ and ¬
∨
∆. Hence,
by the first assumption, it holds that I⊲ |= ¬ϕ⊲P . We will derive a contradiction
from this.
Observe that by our choice of n, for each Q ∈ U , QI
n
= f or QI
n
= u. Denote
by In⊲ the interpretation that assigns QI
n
to Q⊲ for every Q ∈ U and corresponds
to In on all other atoms. There are two simple observations that can be made
about In⊲:
– In⊲ ≤p I⊲: indeed, In ≤p I and for each Q⊲ ∈ U⊲, Q⊲
I⊲ = f ≥p Q⊲
In⊲ = QI
n
=
f or u.
– (ϕ⊲P )
In⊲ = ϕI
n
P = t: obvious from the construction of I
n⊲ and ϕ⊲P .
Combining these results, we obtain t = (ϕ⊲P )
In⊲ ≤p (ϕ
⊲
P )
I⊲ = f . This is the desired
contradiction.
Having the soundness of the left definition rule, we can explain the introduction
of renaming formulas in the left definition rule. Consider the left definition rule of
the following form:
¬P1, . . . ,¬Pn, Γ → ∆,¬ϕP1 ; . . . ;¬P1, . . . ,¬Pn, Γ → ∆,¬ϕPn
Pi, D, Γ → ∆
(1)
where {P1, . . . , Pn} ⊆ τdD and Pi is an arbitrary defined atom in {P1, . . . , Pn}.
Intuitively, the above form of the left definition rule is exactly related to the
second derivation rule 2 of the well-founded induction and it is easier to be un-
derstood. However, such an inference rule is not sound. For an arbitrary definition
D and any defined atom P of D, D → ¬P can be inferred applying this rule. We
illustrate this with the next example.
Example 9. Consider the following definition:
D =
{
P ← ⊤
}
.
Let Γ = {P} and ∆ be an empty set. Since ¬P, P → ¬⊤, we can proveD → ¬P by
using the inference rule (1), the right ¬ rule and the right contraction rule. However,
for the same definition D and empty sets Γ and ∆, it is obvious that D → P can
be inferred by using the right definition rule, which derives a contradiction. Hence,
the inference rule (1) is not sound.
From the viewpoint of semantics, since the left definition rule corresponds to
the second derivation rule 2 of the well-founded induction, we have to adopt the
approach of renaming to represent that the defined atoms of U are unknown in In
and false in In+1.
Lemma 4. Let D be a definition, I a model of D and U a non-empty subset of
τdD. If for every P ∈ U , it holds that ϕ
I[U/f ]
P = f , then P
I = f for all P ∈ U .
Proof. Assume that there exists a non-empty set T satisfying that (a) T ⊆ U ,
(b) P I = t for each P ∈ T , and (c) P I = f for each P ∈ U \ T . Let (In)n≤ξ be a
terminal well-founded induction for D with the limit Iξ = I. Let n be the smallest
n ≤ ξ such that for some Q ∈ T , QI
n
= u and QI
n+1
= t. By selection of n, there
is a unique P ∈ T such that P I
n
= u, ϕI
n
P = t and P
In+1 = t. Consider this P
and ϕP .
Observe that by our choice of n, for each Q ∈ T , QI
n
= u. Hence, for each
Q ∈ T , QI
n
≤p QI[U/f ] = f . Because In ≤p I, for each Q ∈ τdD \ T , we have that
QI[U/f ] = QI ≥p QI
n
. Combining these results, it is concluded that In ≤p I[U/f ].
Therefore, we obtain that t = ϕI
n
P ≤p ϕ
I[U/f ]
P = f , a contradiction. Hence, there is
no P ∈ U such that P I = t, which follows directly that P I = f for all P ∈ U .
Lemma 5 (Soundness of the non-total definition rule). If |= V ⋄, D⋄, Γ →
∆,
∧
¬V ⊲ and |= ¬V ⋄, D⋄, Γ → ∆,
∧
V ⊲, then |= D,Γ → ∆.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that
|= V ⋄, D⋄, Γ → ∆,
∧
¬V ⊲ and |= ¬V ⋄, D⋄, Γ → ∆,
∧
V ⊲ but 6|= D,Γ → ∆.
(2)
Then there exists a τ -interpretation I satisfying D,
∧
Γ and ¬
∨
∆. Consider the
vocabulary τ⋄ = τ ∪ V ⊲ ∪ V ⋄. I can be expanded into two τ⋄-interpretations IV ⋄
and I¬V ⋄ as follows:
IV ⋄ = (I[V
⋄/t])D
⋄
and I¬V ⋄ = (I[V
⋄/f ])D
⋄
.
Since D⋄ is a positive definition, hence total definition with open symbols τ ∪ V ⋄,
both interpretations are well-defined. Moreover they obviously satisfy:
IV ⋄ |=
∧
V ⋄ ∧D⋄ ∧
∧
Γ ∧ ¬
∨
∆ and I¬V ⋄ |=
∧
¬V ⋄ ∧D⋄ ∧
∧
Γ ∧ ¬
∨
∆.
By (2), it follows that
IV ⋄ |=
∧
¬V ⊲ and I¬V ⋄ |=
∧
V ⊲. (3)
Let (In)n≤ξ be a terminal well-founded induction forD with limit I
ξ = I. There
exists a least ordinal n such that P I
n
= u for every P ∈ V and there exists at least
one P ∈ V with P I
n+1
6= u. We distinguish between the case where P is t in In+1
and the case where P ∈ U for some non-empty set U ⊆ τdD such that all atoms of
U are f in In+1. We will prove in the first case that IV ⋄ |= P ⊲ and in the second
case that I¬V ⋄ |= ¬P ⊲ for every P ⊲ ∈ V ⊲ ∩ U⊲. This contradicts (3).
– Assume that P I
n
= u and P I
n+1
= t. Then for the rule P ← ϕP ∈ D, it holds
that ϕI
n
P = t. Consider the corresponding rule P
⊲ ← ϕ⋄P ∈ D
⋄. If we can show
that IV ⋄ |= ϕ⋄P , then Lemma 1 will yield that IV ⋄ |= P
⊲ which is what we must
prove here.
Consider the τ⋄-interpretation In⋄ which extends In by interpreting each sym-
bol Q⊲ and Q⋄ as QI
n
, i.e., as u. Clearly, (ϕ⋄P )
In⋄ = ϕI
n
P = t, and it suffices
to show that In⋄ ≤p IV ⋄ to obtain that IV ⋄ |= ϕ
⋄
P . But this is straightforward
since In⋄|τ = In ≤p I = IV ⋄ |τ and (Q⊲)I
n⋄
= (Q⋄)I
n⋄
= u for each Q ∈ V .
Hence, it is indeed the case that In⋄ ≤p IV ⋄ which leads to the contradiction.
– For the other case, assume that In+1 = In[U/f ] where P ∈ U . For each P ∈
U ∩V (6= ∅) and its rule P ← ϕP ∈ D, it holds that ϕI
n+1
P = f . We will use this
to show that for each rule P ⊲ ← ϕ⋄P ∈ D
⋄ with P ⊲ ∈ U⊲∩V ⊲, ϕ⋄P is false in the
interpretation I¬V ⋄ [U
⊲ ∩ V ⊲/f ]. Then, since I¬V ⋄ satisfies D⋄, we can apply
Lemma 4 to obtain that each P ⊲ ∈ U⊲ ∩ V ⊲ is false in I¬V ⋄ . This produces the
contradiction with (3).
The key point is therefore to show that all these renamed rule bodies ϕ⋄P are
false in the interpretation I¬V ⋄ [U
⊲ ∩ V ⊲/f ]. To prove this, we use the same
technique as in the previous case, namely we construct an interpretation which
is less precise than I¬V ⋄ [U
⊲ ∩ V ⊲/f ] and which falsifies all the concerned rule
bodies. We choose this interpretation as the τ⋄-interpretation I⋄ which extends
In+1 by interpreting each symbol Q⊲ and Q⋄ as QI
n+1
, i.e. as f if Q ∈ U ∩ V
and as u if Q ∈ V \ U . Notice that for all formulas ψ over τ , it holds that
ψI
n+1
= (ψ⋄)I
⋄
.
Let us verify that I⋄ ≤p I¬V ⋄ [U⊲ ∩ V ⊲/f ]. We have I⋄|τ = In+1 ≤p I =
I¬V ⋄ [U
⊲ ∩ V ⊲/f ]|τ . The interpretation I
⋄ interprets all symbols Q⋄ as u or
f whereas I¬V ⋄ [U
⊲ ∩ V ⊲/f ] interprets them as f , just like I¬V ⋄ . Symbols of
U⊲ ∩V ⊲ are interpreted as f in both interpretations, and finally, the remaining
symbols of V ⊲ \ U⊲ are interpreted as u in I⋄ which is certainly less precise
than in the other interpretation.
It follows that for every rule P ⊲ ← ϕ⋄P ∈ D
⋄ with P ∈ V ∩ U , f = ϕI
n+1
P =
(ϕ⋄P )
I⋄ ≤p (ϕ
⋄
P )
I
¬V ⋄ [U
⊲∩V ⊲/f ] = f . As explained before, this leads to the desired
contradiction.
Lemma 6 (Soundness of the definition introduction rule). Let D be a total
definition. If |= D′, Γ → ∆,P ′ ≡ P for every P ∈ τdD, then |= Γ → ∆,D.
Proof. Assume |= D′, Γ → ∆,P ′ ≡ P for every P ∈ τdD but 6|= Γ → ∆,D. Then
there exists a two-valued τ -interpretation I such that I |=
∧
Γ but I 6|=
∨
∆,
I 6|= D. Denote by J the two-valued well-founded model of D extending I|τo
D
.
Because I 6|= D, there exists a defined atom Q of D such that QI 6= QJ . Since D is
a total definition and D′ is obtained by replacing each occurrence of each defined
atom P in D by P ′, D′ is a total definition. Thus, there exists a two-valued τ ′-
interpretation I ′ such that I ′ is the well-founded model of D′ extending I. Notice
that for every P ∈ τdD, P
I′ = P I . Because neither Γ nor ∆ contains an occurrence
of an atom P ′, it holds that I ′ |=
∧
Γ and I ′ 6|=
∨
∆. Therefore, by the first
assumption, it is obtained that I ′ |= P ′ ≡ P for every P ∈ τdD. Also, because D
′ is
obtained by renaming all defined atoms and none of the open atoms, it holds that
P J = (P ′)I
′
for every P ∈ τdD. Hence, Q
I = QI
′
= (Q′)I
′
= QJ , a contradiction.
Therefore, |= Γ → ∆,D.
The definition introduction rule is not sound if the inferred definition D is not
total. We illustrate it with an example.
Example 10. Consider the definition as follows:
D =
{
P ← ¬P
}
.
Let Γ and ∆ be empty sets. It is obvious that D′ =
{
P ′ ← ¬P ′
}
is not total.
Thus, |= D′ → P ′ ≡ P but 6|=→ D, which shows that the definition introduction
rule is not sound when the inferred definition D is non-total.
Notice that all inference rules in LPC(ID) except the definition introduction
rule are sound with respect to both total and non-total definitions. By induction
on the number of inference rules in a proof of a sequent, we can easily prove the
soundness of LPC(ID).
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If a sequent Γ → ∆ is provable in LPC(ID) without
using the definition introduction rule, then |= Γ → ∆. If a sequent Γ → ∆ is
provable in LPC(ID) and all definitions occurring in Γ and ∆ are total, then
|= Γ → ∆.
4.2 Completeness
LPC(ID) is not complete in general. Intuitively, this is because the only inference
rules that allow to introduce a positive occurrence of a definition in the succedent
of a sequent are the axioms, the weakening rules and the definition introduction
rule. As shown in the above subsection, the definition introduction rule is not
sound with respect to non-total definitions. Thus, no other inference rule allows
to derive a non-total definition from some propositional formulas. Therefore, one
cannot synthesize non-total definitions with LPC(ID), i.e., not all valid sequents
of the form Γ → D, where D is a non-total definition, can be proved in this system.
We will however prove the completeness for a restricted class of sequents,
namely the sequents Γ → ∆ such that every definition occurring negatively in
Γ or positively in ∆ must be total. The main difficulty in the completeness proof
for LPC(ID) is to handle the definitions in the sequents (We already know that
the propositional part of LPC(ID) is complete. See e.g. [36,37]).
First, we focus on the completeness of sequents of the form D,Γ → ∆, where
Γ and ∆ are sets of PC-formulas and D is a definition. Notice that the definition
D appearing in the sequent may be non-total.
Lemma 7. Let D be a definition and Γ a set of open literals of D such that for
every Q ∈ τoD either Q ∈ Γ or ¬Q ∈ Γ . Let IO be the unique two-valued τ
o
D-
interpretation such that IO |=
∧
Γ and I the well-founded model of D extending
IO. If L is a defined literal of D such that L
I = t, then D,Γ → L is provable in
LPC(ID).
Proof. Let (In)n≤ξ be a terminal well-founded induction for D extending IO with
the limit Iξ = I. Denote by ∆n a set of all defined literals L such that LI
n
= t
in arbitrary order. We prove that ∆n, D, Γ → L is provable in LPC(ID) for all
L ∈ ∆n+1 \∆n. For each L ∈ ∆n+1 \∆n, LI
n
= u and LI
n+1
= t. We distinguish
between the case where ∆n+1 \∆n contains one positive literal and the case where
it contains a set of negative literals.
– Assume that ∆n+1 \∆n consists of one defined atom P . For every two-valued
τ -interpretation J such that J is a model of
∧
Γ and
∧
∆n, In ≤p J . Indeed,
LI
n
= LJ = t for every L ∈ Γ , LI
n
= LJ = t for every L ∈ ∆n and for
every other atom Q ∈ τ , QI
n
= u ≤p QJ . P I
n+1
= t, hence ϕI
n
P = t. It
follows that ϕJP = t. Thus, |= ∆
n, Γ → ϕP . Therefore, by the completeness
of the propositional part of LPC(ID), the sequent ∆n, Γ → ϕP is provable
in LPC(ID). Hence, by the right definition rule, ∆n, D, Γ → P is provable in
LPC(ID).
– For the other case, assume that ∆n+1 \∆n is a set of negative literals. Denote
the set {P | ¬P ∈ ∆n+1 \∆n} by U . Recall that In+1 = In[U/f ]. P I
n+1
= f for
each P ∈ U , hence ϕI
n+1
P = f . Consider the interpretation I
n+1⊲ = In[U⊲/f ].
There are two simple observations that can be made about In+1
⊲
and each ϕ⊲P :
• In+1
⊲
≤p J ′ for every two-valued τ ∪ U⊲-interpretation J ′ such that J ′
satisfies
∧
Γ ,
∧
∆n and
∧
¬U⊲: indeed, LI
n+1⊲
= LJ
′
= t for every L ∈ Γ ,
LI
n+1⊲
= LJ
′
= t for every L ∈ ∆n, (P ⊲)I
n+1⊲
= P ⊲J
′
= f for every
P ⊲ ∈ U⊲ and QI
n+1⊲
= u ≤p QJ
′
for every other atom Q ∈ τ ∪ U⊲.
• (ϕ⊲P )
In+1
⊲
= ϕI
n+1
P = f : obvious from the construction of I
n+1⊲ and ϕ⊲P .
Combining these results, we obtain (ϕ⊲P )
J′ = f for every two-valued interpreta-
tion J ′ satisfying
∧
Γ ,
∧
∆n and
∧
¬U⊲. It follows that |= ¬U⊲, ∆n, Γ → ¬ϕ⊲P
for every P ∈ U . By the completeness of the propositional part of LPC(ID),
the left definition rule and the right ¬ rule the sequent ∆n, D, Γ → ¬P is
provable in LPC(ID) for every P ∈ U .
Since (In)n≤ξ is a terminal well-founded induction for D with the limit I = I
ξ, it
is obvious that the set of defined literals L for which LI = t is exactly the set of all
defined literals in ∆ξ. Thus, by using the cut rule, it is easy to show by induction
on n that if L is a defined literal of D such that LI = t, the sequent D,Γ → L is
provable in LPC(ID).
Notice that in the above lemma, we do not require the totality of the definition.
So the definition D can be non-total and the well-founded model of D may be a
three-valued interpretation.
Lemma 8. Let D be a total definition and let Γ be a set of open literals of D, such
that for every atom Q ∈ τoD either Q ∈ Γ or ¬Q ∈ Γ . Let L be a defined literal of
D. If |= D,Γ → L, then D,Γ → L is provable in LPC(ID).
Proof. Assume that |= D,Γ → L. Let IO be the unique two-valued τ
o
D-interpretation
such that IO |=
∧
Γ . Because D is total, IO can be extended to a two-valued well-
founded model I of D such that I |=
∧
Γ and I |= D. Then since |= D,Γ → L, it
holds that LI = t. Thus, by Lemma 7, D,Γ → L is provable in LPC(ID).
Lemma 9. Let D be a total definition and Γ an arbitrary consistent set of literals.
If L is a defined literal of D such that |= D,Γ → L, then D,Γ → L is provable in
LPC(ID).
Proof. Let Γ ′ be an arbitrary extension of Γ such that for every open atom Q of
D, either Q ∈ Γ ′ or ¬Q ∈ Γ ′. First, we want to show that D,Γ ′ → L is provable
in LPC(ID). It holds that |= D,Γ ′ → L because |= D,Γ → L. Consider the
set Γ ′′ of all open literals of D in Γ ′. If |= D,Γ ′′ → L, then by the previous
lemma, D,Γ ′′ → L is provable in LPC(ID), and by the left weakening rule, so is
D,Γ ′ → L. If 6|= D,Γ ′′ → L, then by totality of D, |= D,Γ ′′ → ¬L and hence,
|= D,Γ ′ → ¬L. This means that D ∧
∧
Γ ′ is unsatisfiable, which implies that
for some defined literal L′ in Γ ′, |= D,Γ ′′ → ¬L′. By the previous lemma and
the left weakening rule, D,Γ ′ → ¬L′ is provable in LPC(ID). It is obvious that
D,Γ ′ → L′ is an axiom because L′ is a literal in Γ ′. Then we can use the left ¬
rule, the cut rule and the right weakening rule to show that D,Γ ′ → L is provable
in LPC(ID).
Given that the sequents D,Γ ′ → L are provable in LPC(ID) for all extensions
Γ ′ of Γ , by using the right ¬ rule and the cut rule on all D,Γ ′ → L, an LPC(ID)-
proof for D,Γ → L can be constructed.
Lemma 10. Let D be a definition and Γ a set of open literals of D, such that for
every atom Q ∈ τoD either Q ∈ Γ or ¬Q ∈ Γ . If |= D,Γ → ⊥, then D,Γ → ⊥ is
provable in LPC(ID).
Proof. Let IO be the unique two-valued τ
o
D-interpretation such that IO |=
∧
Γ and
(In)n≤ξ a terminal well-founded induction for D extending IO with limit I
ξ = I.
Because |= D,Γ → ⊥, there is no two-valued well-founded model for D extending
IO. Hence I is a three-valued τ -interpretation. Denote by E the set of all defined
atoms of D which are not unknown in I and V the set τdD \E. For each P ∈ E, we
define a literal LP as follows:
LP =
{
P if P I = t
¬P if P I = f
.
Denote by K the set {LP | P ∈ E} of literals. We first want to show that
|= D⋄, V ⋄,K, Γ →
∧
¬V ⊲ and |= D⋄,¬V ⋄,K, Γ →
∧
V ⊲. (4)
Consider the vocabulary τ⋄ = τ ∪ V ⊲ ∪ V ⋄. I can be expanded into two τ⋄-
interpretations IV ⋄ and I¬V ⋄ as follows:
IV ⋄ = (I[V
⋄/t])D
⋄
and I¬V ⋄ = (I[V
⋄/f ])D
⋄
.
Since D⋄ is a positive definition, hence total definition with open symbols τ ∪ V ⋄,
both interpretations are well-defined. Moreover it is obvious that IV ⋄ , respectively
I¬V ⋄ , is the only interpretation satisfying:
IV ⋄ |= D
⋄ ∧
∧
V ⋄ ∧
∧
K ∧
∧
Γ, respectively I¬V ⋄ |= D
⋄ ∧
∧
¬V ⋄ ∧
∧
K ∧
∧
Γ.
In order to prove (4), it suffices to show that
IV ⋄ |=
∧
¬V ⊲ and I¬V ⋄ |=
∧
V ⊲. (5)
– We want to prove that IV ⋄ |=
∧
¬V ⊲. For any P ∈ V with its rule P ← ϕP ∈
D, P ⊲ ← ϕ⋄P is the corresponding rule for P
⊲ in D⋄. If we can show that
IV ⋄ [V
⊲/f ] |= ¬ϕ⋄P for each P
⊲ ∈ V ⊲ with its rule P ⊲ ← ϕ⋄P , then since IV ⋄
satisfies D⋄, we can apply Lemma 4 to obtain that each P ⊲ ∈ V ⊲ is false in
IV ⋄ , which is what we must prove here.
Consider the τ⋄-interpretation I⋄ which extends I by interpreting each symbol
Q⊲ and Q⋄ as QI for each Q ∈ V , i.e., as u. Clearly, for every P ∈ V with
its rule P ← ϕP ∈ D, (ϕ⋄P )
I⋄ = ϕIP = u, and since (ϕ
⋄
P )
IV ⋄ [V
⊲/f ] 6= u, it is
sufficient to show that (ϕ⋄P )
IV ⋄ [V
⊲/f ] ≤ (ϕ⋄P )
I⋄ to obtain that IV ⋄ [V
⊲/f ] |= ¬ϕ⋄P
for every P ⊲ ∈ V ⊲ with its rule P ⊲ ← ϕ⋄P ∈ D
⋄. This can be verified by the
following observations.
• IV ⋄ [V ⊲/f ]|τ = I⋄|τ .
• For everyQ ∈ V , every occurrence ofQ⊲ in ϕ⋄P is positive and (Q
⊲)IV ⋄ [V
⊲/f ] =
f ≤ (Q⊲)I
⋄
= u.
• For everyQ ∈ V , every occurrence ofQ⋄ in ϕ⋄P is negative and (Q
⋄)IV ⋄ [V
⊲/f ] =
t ≥ (Q⋄)I
⋄
= u
Hence, it is indeed the case that (ϕ⋄P )
IV ⋄ [V
⊲/f ] ≤ (ϕ⋄P )
I⋄ , as desired.
– We want to prove that I¬V ⋄ |=
∧
V ⊲. Assume toward contradiction that there
exists a non-empty set F ⊲ ⊆ V ⊲ such that I¬V ⋄ |=
∧
¬F ⊲ and for the set
T ⊲ = V ⊲ \ F ⊲, I¬V ⋄ |=
∧
T ⊲. Consider the τ -interpretation I1 = I[F/f ]. If
we can show that ϕI
1
P = f for every P ∈ F with its rule P ← ϕP ∈ D, then
since for each P ∈ F and its rule P ← ϕP ∈ D, P I = u and ϕI
1
P = f , I can
be extended to I1 in the well-founded induction (In)n≤ξ for D. This produces
the contradiction to that I is the limit of (In)n≤ξ. To prove that ϕ
I1
P = f for
every P ∈ F with the rule P ← ϕP ∈ D, we first choose a τ⋄-interpretation I⋄
which extends I1 by interpreting each symbol Q⊲ and Q⋄ as QI
1
, i.e., as f if
Q ∈ F and as u if Q ∈ T . Notice that for all formulas ψ over τ , it holds that
ψI
1
= (ψ⋄)I
⋄
. Thus, it is sufficient to show that (ϕ⋄P )
I⋄ = f for every P ⊲ ∈ F ⊲
with the rule P ⊲ ← ϕ⋄P ∈ D
⋄. Since I¬V ⋄ |= ¬P ⊲ for each P ⊲ ∈ F ⊲ and I¬V ⋄
is a model of D⋄, by Lemma 1, we have that (ϕ⋄P )
I
¬V ⋄ = f for every P ⊲ ∈ F ⊲
with the rule P ⊲ ← ϕ⋄P ∈ D
⋄. If we can have that (ϕ⋄P )
I⋄ ≤ (ϕ⋄P )
I
¬V ⋄ = f , it
holds that (ϕ⋄P )
I⋄ = f , which is exactly what we need.
We can verify that (ϕ⋄P )
I⋄ ≤ (ϕ⋄P )
I
¬V ⋄ by the following facts.
• I¬V ⋄ |τ = I⋄|τ .
• Every occurrence of Q⊲ in ϕ⋄P is positive and (Q
⊲)I¬V ⋄ = (Q⊲)I
⋄
= f for
each Q⊲ ∈ F ⊲ while (Q⊲)I
⋄
= u ≤ (Q⊲)I¬V ⋄ = t for each Q⊲ ∈ V ⊲ \ F ⊲.
• Every occurrence of Q⋄ in ϕ⋄P is negative and (Q
⋄)I¬V ⋄ = (Q⋄)I
⋄
= f for
each Q⋄ ∈ F ⋄ while (Q⋄)I
⋄
= u ≥ (Q⋄)I¬V ⋄ = f for each Q⋄ ∈ V ⋄ \ F ⋄.
Hence, it is the case that (ϕ⋄P )
I⋄ ≤ (ϕ⋄P )
I
¬V ⋄ = f , as desired.
Therefore, it is obtained that |= D⋄, V ⋄,K, Γ →
∧
¬V ⊲ and |= D⋄,¬V ⋄,K, Γ →∧
V ⊲. D⋄ is a total definition, hence by using Lemma 9 and the right ∧ rule, both
V ⋄, D⋄,K, Γ →
∧
¬V ⊲ and ¬V ⋄, D⋄,K, Γ →
∧
V ⊲ are provable in LPC(ID).
It follows from the non-total definition rule that K,D, Γ → ⊥ is provable in
LPC(ID). Since I is a well-founded model of D extending IO and L
I = t for
each L ∈ K, using Lemma 7, it holds that for each L ∈ K, D,Γ → L is provable
in LPC(ID). Consequently, by the multiple use of the cut rule on K,D, Γ → ⊥
and D,Γ → L for each L ∈ K, D,Γ → ⊥ is provable in LPC(ID).
Lemma 11. Let D be a definition and Γ a set of open literals of D such that for
every atom Q ∈ τoD, either Q ∈ Γ or ¬Q ∈ Γ . Let L be a defined literal of D. If
|= D,Γ → L, then D,Γ → L is provable in LPC(ID).
Proof. Assume |= D,Γ → L. Let IO be the unique two-valued τoD-interpretation
such that IO |=
∧
Γ . If 6|= D,Γ → ⊥, then IO can be extended to the two-valued
well-founded model I of D such that I |=
∧
Γ and I |= D. Since |= D,Γ → L,
it holds that I |= L. Thus, by Lemma 7, D,Γ → L is provable in LPC(ID). If
|= D,Γ → ⊥, then by Lemma 10, D,Γ → ⊥ is provable in LPC(ID). Hence, by
the right weakening rule, D,Γ → L is provable in LPC(ID).
Lemma 12. Let D be a definition and Γ an arbitrary consistent set of literals. If
|= D,Γ → ⊥, then D,Γ → ⊥ is provable in LPC(ID).
To prove this, we use the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 9. We omit the
details of the proof here.
Lemma 13. Let D be a definition, Γ an arbitrary consistent set of literals and L
a defined literal of D. If |= D,Γ → L, then D,Γ → L is provable in LPC(ID).
Proof. If Γ ∪ {¬L} is an inconsistent set of literals, we have that D,Γ → L is
an axiom and thus, D,Γ → L is provable in LPC(ID). If Γ ∪ {¬L} is consistent,
because |= D,Γ,¬L→ ⊥, by the previous lemma, it is obtained that D,Γ,¬L→ ⊥
is provable in LPC(ID). Then by the ¬ rules and the cut rule, we can conclude
that D,Γ → L is provable in LPC(ID).
The remainder of the completeness proof for the class of sequents, namely the
sequents Γ,D → ∆ where Γ and ∆ are sets of PC-formulas and D is a definition,
will use a standard technique: we construct the so called reduction tree for a sequent
Γ → ∆. We follow the approach from [37]. First, we introduce some terminology.
Definition 5. A reduction tree for a sequent S = Γ → ∆ is a tree TS of sequents.
The root of TS is S. Moreover, TS is constructed by applying one of the following
reductions on each non-leaf Π → Σ.
– (left ¬ reduction) Π contains a sequent formula ¬A, then write down Π \
{¬A} → Σ,A as the unique child of Π → Σ.
– (right ¬ reduction) Σ contains a sequent formula ¬A, then write down A,Π →
Σ \ {¬A} as the unique child of Π → Σ.
– (left ∧ reduction) Π contains a sequent formula A∧B, then write down A,B,Π\
{A ∧B} → Σ as the unique child of Π → Σ.
– (right ∧ reduction) Σ contains a sequent formula A∧B, then write down Π →
Σ \ {A ∧B}, A and Π → Σ \ {A ∧B}, B as two children of Π → Σ.
– (left ∨ reduction) Π contains a sequent formula A∨B, then write down A,Π \
{A ∨B} → Σ and B,Π \ {A ∨B} → Σ as two children of Π → Σ.
– (right ∨ reduction) Σ contains a sequent formula A∨B, then write down Π →
Σ \ {A ∨B}, A,B as the unique child of Π → Σ.
– (definition introduction reduction) Σ contains a sequent formula D, which is a
total definition with τdD = {P1, . . . , Pn}, then write down D
′, Π → Σ\{D}, P ′i ≡
Pi for each i ∈ [1, n] as n children of Π → Σ.
In addition, each leaf of TS is either an axiom, or none of the above reductions is
possible.
Observe that the definition introduction reduction corresponds to the definition
introduction rule while each other reduction respectively corresponds to a logical
inference rule. Each leaf node of a reduction tree is either an axiom or a sequent
of the form D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ∆ where Γ and ∆ are sets of atoms with Γ ∩∆ = ∅
and D1, . . . , Dn are definitions.
Definition 6. An inference rule preserves counter-model if for each instance of
the inference rule, a counter-model for one of the premises of the instance is the
same as a counter-model for the conclusion of the instance.
The following property can easily be verified.
Proposition 4. All the logical inference rules preserve counter-models.
Lemma 14. The definition introduction rule preserves counter-model.
Proof. Let D be a total definition. Then D′ is a total definition because of its
construction. Assume that I is a counter-model of D′, Γ → ∆,P ′ ≡ P for some
P ∈ τdD, but I is not a counter-model of Γ → ∆,D. Since D and D
′ are total, I
is a two-valued interpretation satisfying D′,
∧
Γ , ¬
∨
∆ and ¬(P ′ ≡ P ). Because
I is not a counter-model for Γ → ∆,D, it holds that I |= D. Obviously from the
construction of D′ and the fact that I satisfies both D and D′, we conclude that
I |= P ′ ≡ P for every P ∈ τdD, a contradiction.
Then we obtain the property of reduction trees as follows.
Proposition 5. For each sequent S = Γ → ∆, (a) there exists a reduction tree
TS, (b) if all leaf nodes of a reduction tree TS are provable in LPC(ID), then the
root sequent is provable in LPC(ID), and (c) , there exists a leaf node of TS such
that a counter-model for this leaf node is a counter-model for the root.
Proof. Clearly, a reduction tree exists because it can be constructed by a non-
deterministic reduction process. Because each reduction in a reduction tree corre-
sponds to either the definition introduction rule or a logical inference rule, by using
the corresponding inference rule, it is easy to prove that if the children of a node
in a reduction tree are provable in LPC(ID), then the node itself is provable in
LPC(ID). Therefore, the root sequent is provable in LPC(ID) if all leaf nodes of
the reduction tree are provable in LPC(ID).
A counter-model for a leaf is a counter-model for the root because all the log-
ical inference rules and the definition introduction rule preserve counter-models
by Proposition 4 and Lemma 14 and each non-leaf node can be proved from its
children using only those inference rules.
We are now ready to prove the completeness theorem of the sequents of the
form D,Γ → ∆, where Γ and ∆ are sets of PC-formulas and D is a definition.
Theorem 2 (Completeness for one definition in the antecedent). Let Γ
and ∆ be sets of PC-formulas and D a definition. If |= D,Γ → ∆, then D,Γ → ∆
is provable in LPC(ID).
Proof. First, a reduction tree is constructed from the root D,Γ → ∆. Every leaf
of the reduction tree must be an axiom or a sequent of the form D,Π → Σ, where
Π and Σ are (possibly empty) sets of propositional atoms satisfying that (a) Π
and Σ have no atom in common, and (b) when Σ is not empty, Π or Σ contains
at least one defined atom of D. By (c) of Proposition 5, if |= D,Γ → ∆, then
|= D,Π → Σ. Hence, if Σ is empty, by Lemma 12, it is obtained that D,Π → Σ
is provable in LPC(ID). If Σ is not empty, by Lemma 13, the ¬ rules and the
weakening rules, D,Π → Σ is provable in LPC(ID). Extending for every leaf
D,Π → Σ the branch that ends in that leaf with the prooftree for that leaf, yields
an LPC(ID)-proof for D,Γ → ∆.
LPC(ID) remains complete for sequents of the formD1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ∆, where
Γ and ∆ are sets of PC-formulas and multiple definitions are allowed in the an-
tecedent.
Lemma 15. Let D1, . . . , Dn be definitions and Γ an arbitrary consistent set of lit-
erals. If |= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ⊥, then D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ⊥ is provable in LPC(ID).
Proof. Let Γ ′ be an arbitrary extension of Γ such that for everyDi ∈ {D1, . . . , Dn}
and every open atomQ ofDi, eitherQ ∈ Γ ′ or ¬Q ∈ Γ ′. First, we want to show that
D1, . . . , Dn, Γ
′ → ⊥ is provable in LPC(ID). It holds that |= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ ′ → ⊥
because |= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ⊥. Consider the set Γ ′′ of all open literals of all defini-
tionsD1, . . . , Dn in Γ
′. We distinguish between the case where |= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ
′′ →
⊥ and the case where 6|= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ ′′ → ⊥.
– In the first case where |= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ ′′ → ⊥, we distinguish between the sub-
case where there exists at least oneDi ∈ {D1, . . . , Dn} such that |= Di, Γ ′′ → ⊥
and the subcase where for every Di ∈ {D1, . . . , Dn} it holds that 6|= Di, Γ
′′ →
⊥.
• In the first subcase, |= Di, Γ ′′ → ⊥, hence by Lemma 12, Di, Γ ′′ → ⊥ is
provable in LPC(ID). Then by using the left weakening rule, we conclude
that D1, . . . , Dn, Γ
′ → ⊥ is provable in LPC(ID).
• In the other subcase, it holds that 6|= Di, Γ ′′ → ⊥ for everyDi ∈ {D1, . . . , Dn}.
Thus, for every Di ∈ {D1, . . . , Dn}, there exists a unique two-valued well-
founded model Ii of Di such that Ii |= Di and Ii |=
∧
Γ ′′. Because
D1 ∧ . . . ∧ Dn ∧
∧
Γ ′′ is unsatisfiable, for some Ii and Ij such that i 6= j
and for some defined literal L, it can be implied that Ii |= L and Ij |= ¬L.
Thus, we have that |= Di, Γ
′′ → L and |= Dj, Γ
′′ → ¬L. Therefore, by
Lemma 13, it is concluded that both Di, Γ
′′ → L and Dj , Γ ′′ → ¬L are
provable in LPC(ID). Then we can use the left weakening rule, the left
¬ rule and the cut rule to show that D1, . . . , Dn, Γ ′ → ⊥ is provable in
LPC(ID).
– In the other case where 6|= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ ′′ → ⊥, hence there exists a unique
two-valued interpretation I such that I |= D1 ∧ . . . ∧ Dn ∧
∧
Γ ′′. Because 6|=
D1, . . . , Dn, Γ
′′ → ⊥, for each Di ∈ {D1, . . . , Dn}, it holds that 6|= Di, Γ ′′ → ⊥
and hence, there exists a unique two-valued well-founded model Ii of Di such
that Ii |= Di and Ii |=
∧
Γ ′′. Therefore, for each Di and each defined atom
P ∈ τdDi , P
Ii = P I . Since D1 ∧ . . . ∧ Dn ∧
∧
Γ ′′ is satisfiable but D1 ∧ . . . ∧
Dn ∧
∧
Γ ′ is unsatisfiable, it can be implied that for some defined literal L′
in Γ ′, |= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ
′′ → ¬L′. Assume that L′ is a defined literal of Di.
Because L′
Ii = L′
I
= f , we have that |= Di, Γ ′′ → ¬L′. By Lemma 13 and the
left weakening rule, Di, Γ
′ → ¬L′ is provable in LPC(ID). It is obvious that
Di, Γ
′ → L′ is an axiom because L′ is a literal in Γ ′. Then we can use the left
weakening rule, the left ¬ rule and the cut rule to show thatD1, . . . , Dn, Γ ′ → ⊥
is provable in LPC(ID).
Given that the sequents D1, . . . , Dn, Γ
′ → ⊥ are provable in LPC(ID) for all ex-
tensions Γ ′ of Γ , by using the right ¬ rule and the cut rule on all D1, . . . , Dn, Γ ′ →
⊥, we can construct an LPC(ID)-proof for D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ⊥.
Lemma 16. Let D1, . . . , Dn be definitions and let Γ and ∆ be sets of atoms. If
|= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ∆, then D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ∆ is provable in LPC(ID).
Proof. The proof is trivial if D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ∆ is an axiom, hence we assume that
D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ∆ is not an axiom, i.e. Γ ∩∆ = ∅. Because Γ,¬∆ is a consistent
set of literals and |= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ,¬∆→ ⊥, by the previous lemma, we have that
D1, . . . , Dn, Γ,¬∆→ ⊥ is provable in LPC(ID). Then by the ¬ rules and the cut
rule, we can conclude that D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ∆ is provable in LPC(ID).
The following completeness theorem of the sequents with multiple definitions in
the antecedent is an immediate consequence of Lemma 16 and the reduction tree
for sequents.
Theorem 3 (Completeness for multiple definitions in the antecedent).
Let Γ and∆ be sets of PC-formulas and D1, . . . , Dn definitions. If |= D1, . . . , Dn, Γ →
∆, then D1, . . . , Dn, Γ → ∆ is provable in LPC(ID).
Then we have the following main completeness theorem.
Theorem 4 (Completeness). If |= Γ → ∆ and all definitions occurring either
negatively in Γ or positively in ∆ are total, then Γ → ∆ is provable in LPC(ID).
Proof. Let Γ → ∆ be a valid sequent such that any definition which occurs either
negatively in Γ or positively in ∆ is total and let TS be a reduction tree with root
Γ → ∆. Then by (c) of Proposition 5, all leaves of TS are valid. Since all leaves are
of the form D1, . . . , Dn, Π → Σ where Π and Σ are sets of atoms and D1, . . . , Dn
are definitions, it follows from Theorem 3 that they are provable in LPC(ID).
Hence, by (b) of Proposition 5, Γ → ∆ is provable in LPC(ID).
5 Complexity results
In this section, we provide some complexity results for PC(ID), which may give
some helpful insight into the reasoning problems in PC(ID).
Proposition 6. Satisfiability problem in PC(ID) is NP-complete.
Proof. (Membership) Propositional well-founded models can be computed in poly-
nomial time, e.g. using the algorithm of Van Gelder in [20]. It is easy to define an
algorithm that uses this well-founded semantics algorithm and finds models that
satisfy PC(ID) theories in polynomial time on a non-deterministic turing machine.
(Hardness) Any satisfiability problem for propositional logic is trivially also a
satisfiability problem for PC(ID).
Recall Definition 3 of totality of a definition D with respect to a theory T :
for each I |=
∧
T , the well-founded model of D extending I|τo
D
must be two-
valued. Deciding totality is an interesting problem, not least because we cannot even
formulate an inference rule to prove totality of a propositional inductive definition
in the context of a certain set of PC(ID)-formulas.
Proposition 7. Deciding whether a given propositional inductive definition is total
with respect to a given propositional theory is co-NP-complete problem.
Proof. (Membership) Let D be a propositional inductive definition, T a proposi-
tional theory. Any interpretation I such that I |=
∧
T and the well-founded model
of D extending I|τo
D
is not two-valued, is a certificate for the non-totality of D with
respect to T . Both checking whether I |=
∧
T and whether the well-founded model
of D extending I|τo
D
is two-valued can be done in polynomial time.
(Hardness) Consider the definitionD =
{
P ← ¬P ∧ T
}
.D is total with respect
to the empty theory if and only if T is unsatisfiable. Thus we have found an instance
of our decision problem that is equivalent to a co-NP-hard decision problem, namely
unsatisfiability problem for propositional logic.
6 Conclusions, related and further work
We presented a deductive system for the propositional fragment of FO(ID) which
extends the sequent calculus for propositional logic. The main technical results
are the soundness and completeness theorems of LPC(ID). We also provide some
complexity results for PC(ID).
Related work is provided by Hagiya and Sakurai in [22]. They proposed to
interpret a (stratified) logic program as iterated inductive definitions of Martin-Lo¨f
[30] and developed a proof theory which is sound with respect to the perfect model,
and hence, the well-founded semantics of logic programming. A formal proof system
based on tableau methods for analyzing computation for Answer Set Programming
(ASP) was given as well by Gebser and Schaub [18]. As shown in [26], ASP is
closely related to FO(ID). The approach presented in [18] furnishes declarative
and fine-grained instruments for characterizing operations as well as strategies of
ASP-solvers and provides a uniform proof-theoretic framework for analyzing and
comparing different algorithms, which is the first of its kind for ASP.
The first topic for future work, as mentioned in Section 1, is the development and
implementation of a proof checker for MiniSat(ID). This would require more study
on resolution-based inference rules since MiniSat(ID) is basically an adaption of
the DPLL-algorithm for SAT [10,9].
On the theoretical level, we plan to develop proof systems and decidable frag-
ments of FO(ID). As mentioned in Section 1, FO(ID) is not even semi-decidable
and thus, a sound and complete proof system for FO(ID) does not exist. Therefore,
we hope to build useful proof systems for FO(ID) that can solve a broad class of
problems and investigate subclasses of FO(ID) for which they are decidable.
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